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Now, decades after the first environmental laws werepassed in this country, policymakers face many choices
when seeking to solve environmental problems. Will taxing
polluters for their discharges be more effective than fining
them for not meeting certain emissions standards? Will a reg-
ulatory agency find it less costly to enforce a ban or oversee
a system of tradable permits? Which strategy will reduce a
pollutant the quickest?
Clearly, there are no “one-size-fits-all” answers. Many fac-
tors enter into the decision to favor either policies that lean
more toward economic incentives (EI) and toward direct
regulation, commonly referred to as command-and-control
(CAC) policy. Underlying determinants include a country’s
governmental and regulatory infrastructure, along with the
nature of the environmental problem itself.
Even with these contextual factors to consider, we thought
it would be useful to compare EI and CAC policies and their
outcomes in a real-world setting. To do this, we looked at six
environmental problems that the United States and at least
one European country dealt with differently (see box on 
page 14.) For each problem, one approach was more of an EI
measure, while the other relied more on CAC. For example,
to reduce point-source industrial water pollution, the Nether-
lands implemented a system of fees for organic pollutants
(EI), while the United States established a system of guidelines
and permits (CAC). It turned out, in fact, that most policies
had at least some elements of both approaches, but we cate-
gorized them as EI or CAC based on their dominant features.
We then asked researchers who had previously studied
these policies on either side of the Atlantic to update or pre-
pare new case studies. We analyzed the 12 case studies (two
for each of the six environmental problems) against a list of
hypotheses frequently made for or against EI and CAC, such
as which instrument is more effective or imposes less admin-
istrative burden.
The Evolution of CAC and EI
Only recently has it been possible to find enough EI poli-cies to carry out a project such as this. Until about 15
years ago the environmental policies actually chosen were
heavily dominated by CAC approaches. In the United States,
the 1970s saw a great volume of new federal regulation to pro-
mote environmental quality, none of which could be charac-
terized as relying heavily upon economic incentives. Since
then, however, there has been a remarkable surge of interest
in EI approaches in environmental policy. Since the late
1980s, whenever new environmental policies are proposed, it
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is almost inevitable that economic incentive instruments will
be considered and will receive a respectful hearing.
The reasons for the newfound popularity of EI policies are
unclear. Perhaps it is due to the growth in awareness of eco-
nomic incentive approaches among policymakers and policy
analysts over the 20 years between 1970 and 1990. In the
1970s these approaches were generally unfamiliar to those
outside the economics profession. 
Another possibility is the emergence of tradable emissions
permits in the late 1970s. Before then, the main EI alterna-
tive to the regulatory policies being implemented was a per-
unit tax on pollution (sometimes referred to as an effluent
fee). By the 1980s the policy community was generally aware
of a “quantity-based” EI alternative— tradable emission per-
mits— that seemed to provide the same assurances of the
achievement of environmental goals that were offered by
CAC approaches.
A third possible cause is the widespread disappointment
with outcomes of the CAC regulations adopted in the 1970s.
The nearly limitless variety of American industries and in-
dustrial processes required the EPA to write very detailed and
complex regulations, but despite these efforts, the Agency
faced a raft of legal challenges. Regulatory complexity com-
bined with litigiousness delayed the implementation of most
regulations far beyond the schedules envisioned by Congress.
In other words, much of the enthusiasm for EI could be at-
tributed to disenchantment with CAC.
The Two Sides of the Pond
It is worth underscoring some differences between theUnited States and Europe that serve as a backdrop to pol-
icy decisions and implementation.
First, of course, we are comparing a single federal system
in the United States with the many countries of the European
Union (EU). Beginning in the late 1960s, environmental pol-
icymaking became centralized in the United States. In Eu-
rope, each country has adopted policies according to its own
timetable, generally beginning in the late 1960s in the wealth-
iest nations and sweeping south and east to the former Soviet
empire by the 1990s. Environmental policy in Europe is now
a mix of country-specific and EU-wide measures, which these
cases reflect.
Second, there are major differences between the United
States and Europe in the extent of pre-regulatory studies un-
dertaken. Because of the U.S. requirement on agencies like
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to conduct a Reg-
ulatory Impact Analysis before taking action, substantially
more information was available about the hoped-for benefits
of U.S. policies. A further issue concerns the greater reliance
on taxes for regulatory purposes in Europe compared to the
United States. A number of European nations use such
taxes— sometimes combined with incentive-compatible re-
bate schemes— to achieve environmental objectives.
In the United States, environmental taxes are virtually non-
existent. Overall, despite these various differences in ap-
proaches, we were not able to discern clear differences in reg-
ulatory outcomes across the Atlantic: in some cases one or
more European nations acted sooner or more aggressively to
address environmental problems while in other cases the
United States acted sooner or more aggressively.
Testing the Hypotheses
Since the 1970s, when western countries began formingcomprehensive environmental policies, there has been a
good deal of speculation and disagreement over the differ-
THE SIX ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS WE STUDIED
In our analysis, we selected six environmental problems in order tocompare EI and CAC approaches, which are summarized below.
We paired a policy from the United States with one implemented in
one or more European countries.
For clarity’s sake, although almost all contain some blend of EI
and CAC elements, those that are more closely associated with EI in-
struments are listed first:
1. SO2 emissions from utility boilers: Permit market (United States)
vs. sulfur emissions standards (Germany)
2. NOx emissions from utility boilers: Emission taxes (Sweden and
France) vs. NOx New Source Performance Standards (United States)
3. Industrial water pollution: Effluent fees (Netherlands) vs. Effluent
Guidelines and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System per-
mits (United States)
4. Leaded gasoline: Marketable permits for leaded fuel production
(United States) vs. mandatory lead phase-outs plus differential taxes
to prevent misfueling (most European countries)
5. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC): Permit market (United States) vs.
mandatory phase-outs (other industrial countries)
6. Chlorinated solvents: Source regulation (United States) vs. three
distinct policy approaches (Germany, Sweden, Norway)
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ences between EI and CAC instruments in practice. These
discussions boil down to assertions or hypotheses about com-
parative advantages of each instrument. We compiled a list
of the 12 most commonly stated hypotheses, recognizing that
different observers might develop very different lists.
Below we discuss the five hypotheses that we consider most
important in evaluating a policy instrument. For each, we
state the hypothesis, review the original rationale in making
it, and then test whether the hypothesis holds up in light of
one or more of our case studies.
EI instruments are more efficient than CAC instruments: that is,
they result in a lower unit cost of abatement.
Rationale: It is commonly believed that EI instruments have
an efficiency advantage over CAC instruments, although the
case is not airtight. EI instruments are more cost effective at
achieving a given emissions reduction. But to get from cost-
effectiveness to efficiency requires additional assumptions,
including that the system is one of perfect competition and
that the emissions are not location-specific. A theoretical
counter to this hypothesis is that a CAC instrument can be as
efficient if the emissions standard for each plant is chosen so
that the marginal costs of abatement equal the marginal so-
cial costs of pollutant damage.
Performance: The cases we analyzed show that EI is gener-
ally more efficient. For example, in looking at the U.S. pro-
gram of marketable permits to lower SO2 emissions, realized
costs are only about one-half what was expected back in 1990
and about one-quarter of the estimated cost of various CAC
standards. EI also achieved substantial cost savings in the
elimination of CFCs and lead in gasoline, in part because of
cost heterogeneities that could be exploited during the
phase-down period. However, in instances where the regula-
tions are so stringent that practically all available abatement
measures must be taken, there is little scope for choosing the
most cost-effective ones, and EI instruments do not achieve
significant cost savings over CAC. EI also enjoys little advan-
tage if all plants face similar abatement costs. Both these
conditions limited, for example, the efficiency losses of using
CAC for the German SO2 emissions.
The real advantages of EI instruments are only realized over time,
because they provide a continual incentive to reduce emissions, thus
promoting new technology, and permit maximum flexibility in
achieving emissions reductions.
Rationale: The effects of CAC on technology are poten-
tially complex. On the one hand, costly regulations provide
a spur to find less costly ways of compliance. On the other,
the requirement to install a specific technology conceivably
discourages research, since discovering new ways to reduce
Regulatory complexity
combined with litigiousness
delayed the implementation of
most regulations far beyond
the schedules envisioned by
Congress. In other words,
much of the enthusiasm for EI
could be attributed to
disenchantment with CAC.
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emissions can lead to more stringent regulations. More strin-
gent performance standards for new plants have the stated
objective of promoting technology, but they can also have
the pernicious effect of postponing retirements of older,
dirtier plants and discouraging entry by outside firms.
Performance: EI provides greater incentives than CAC for
continuing innovation over time in many, but not all, cases
studied. For example, the Swedish NOx tax induced experi-
mentation in boiler operations that led to substantial reduc-
tions in NOx emissions. Because NOx emissions from boilers
are idiosyncratic, it was unknown beforehand what would
work in each boiler. Achieving these reductions from CAC
would therefore have been impossible. Similarly, the U.S.
SO2 trading policy induced many nonpatentable boiler-
specific innovations on utility boilers. Elsewhere, the Nether-
lands became a world leader in water purification technolo-
gies and its industries adopted more advanced, process-
integrated measures to reduce pollutants.
Innovation also occurs under CAC, but the results are of-
ten different. For example, the lead phase-down induced
emissions reductions in all plants during the period when a
CAC policy was employed, but when the policy allowed per-
mit trading and banking, the reductions were concentrated
in newer plants with longer expected lifetimes, where the im-
provements were most cost-effective. In the United States,ex-
amination of patents, in the context of SO2 policy, suggests
that in a CAC regime only cost-reducing innovations are en-
couraged, while under EI both cost-reducing and emissions-
reducing innovations are encouraged.
CAC policies achieve their objectives quicker and with greater cer-
tainty than EI policies.
Rationale: In the early 1970s, CAC was seen as the way to ex-
pedite compliance, even if the approach was not the least
costly. It appeared then that EI instruments, particularly
emissions fees, would not achieve the same objectives.
Performance :The evidence from the cases is mixed. Sup-
porting the relative effectiveness of CAC is the U.S. effort to
phase out the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE), in which EPA
ultimately mandated limits. The EI aspects of the rule did not
attract significant industry participation. In phasing out
leaded gasoline in Europe, progress would have significantly
slowed without mandating catalytic converters and maximum
lead content in addition to tax differentials.
On the other hand, several cases argue that EI policies are
more effective. In the Dutch water case, for example, the
influence of effluent fees on organic waste-load reductions
was prompt and large. Similarly, by eliciting industry coop-
eration, the trading and banking program probably achieved
a much more rapid phase-down of lead in gasoline than
In the United States,
examination of patents, in 
the context of SO2 policy,
suggests that in a CAC 
regime only cost-reducing
innovations are encouraged,
while under EI both 
cost-reducing and emissions-
reducing innovations 
are encouraged.
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would have been possible with a CAC program that industry
would have opposed.
A final point on effectiveness is that two cases show that
both approaches can result in significant environmental
gains, but with undesirable longer-term side effects. In the
United States, NOx emissions from coal-fired power plants
were reduced, but the standards, which only affected new
plants, caused firms to extend the life of older, more-pollut-
ing plants to avoid the costs associated with newer ones. In
Sweden, TCE users persuaded the public and authorities that
complete implementation of a ban would cause them undue
harm. They received numerous waivers and exceptions, thus
undermining the authority of the environmental agency and
perhaps emboldening other firms to oppose other regula-
tions.
Regulated firms are more likely to oppose EI regulations than CAC
because they fear they will face higher costs, despite the greater
efficiency of EI instruments.
Rationale: Although EI instruments may have lower social
costs overall, firms pay higher costs under EI than CAC. Un-
der CAC, the argument goes, the polluting firm pays to abate
pollution; under many EI instruments, the firm pays the cost
of abatement plus a fee for the remaining pollution it dis-
charges. The firm is better off only if the abatement cost is
lower by an amount at least as great as the fee payments.
Performance: Experience on both sides of the Atlantic sug-
gests that no government has put this hypothesis to the test,
which, in a way, is strong support for it. In nearly all cases,
governments eliminate the burden of EI instruments by re-
turning fees to the firms. For example, in France, revenues
collected through NOx discharge fees subsidized the firms’
abatement investments, while in Sweden the fees were re-
turned to the firms on the basis of the energy they produced.
In the United States, where the EI instrument of choice is a
tradable permit, the permits have always been given away
rather than auctioned off.
CAC policies have higher administrative costs.
Rationale: Administrative costs are determined by the amount
of interaction between the regulator and regulated source.
Supporters of this hypothesis note that the complexity of 
setting and enforcing specific requirements is higher than
implementing fee-based EI policies. In addition, fees for in-
creased emissions tend to rise gradually, whereas with CAC,
a line separates compliance from violation. The potentially
high incremental cost at the point of violation gives regulated
sources an incentive to defend themselves legally rather than
accept sanctions, thus adding to the regulators’ burden.
Performance: The cases show no clear pattern. While the
CAC-oriented Effluent Guidelines program in the United
States imposed high administrative costs on EPA, so did the
EI instruments of the lead phase-down program. Looking at
SO2 reduction, the EI oriented U.S. trading program gained
a reputation for low administrative costs, but the SO2 reduc-
tion program in Germany does not show evidence of higher
administrative costs than a comparable EI program. Overall,
because the evidence on this hypothesis is mixed, we could
not form a firm conclusion about whether policy outcomes
supported or refuted it.
Apples and Oranges?
Q uestions of effectiveness and efficiency were at the coreof the initial selection of policy instruments in the
1970s and 1980s. As these cases show, EI instruments appear
to produce cost savings in pollution abatement, as well as in-
novations that reduce the overall cost. The concern that EI
instruments are not as effective is not borne out in our analy-
sis. However, the finding about EI’s economic effciency is
tempered by evidence that polluting firms prefer a CAC in-
strument because of its perceived lower costs to them. In all
but one of the case studies, the actual or potential revenue
raised by EI instruments had to be reimbursed in some way
to the firms. This, of course, means the revenues cannot be
used for other purposes.
In the 1970s, almost all environmental policies relied on
direct regulation, with very rare instances of EI instruments.
Since the late 1980s, on the other hand, whenever a new pol-
icy is proposed, policymakers at least consider, and often se-
lect, an EI instrument. That said, almost all the policies that
we studied are a blend of both, beginning as a CAC policy
and then having EI elements added or substituted. In the 12
cases we studied, in fact, only a few (reduction of SO2 emis-
sions in Germany, TCE in Germany and Sweden) had no EI
elements in their design. Moreover, we can report significant
environmental results from the cases we studied. Averaged
across all 12, emissions fell by about two-thirds when com-
pared to baseline estimates. Most outcomes either met or 
exceeded policymakers’ original expectations. This is en-
couraging news for those seeking environmental improve-
ments in the future. 
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